of 1812 should be learned by Englishmen of the present day, when
a long naval peace has generated a confidence in numerical
superiority, in the mere possession of heavier _matériel_, and
in the merits of a rigidly uniform system of training, which
confidence, as experience has shown, is too often the forerunner
of misfortune. It is neither patriotic nor intelligent to minimise
the American successes. Certainly they have been exaggerated by
Americans and even by ourselves. To take the frigate actions
alone, as being those which properly attracted most attention,
we see that the captures in action amounted to three on each
side, the proportionate loss to our opponents, considering the
smallness of their fleet, being immensely greater than ours.
We also see that no British frigate was taken after the first
seven months of a war which lasted two and a half years, and that
no British frigate succumbed except to admittedly superior force.
Attempts have been made to spread a belief that our reverses
were due to nothing but the greater size and heavier guns of our
enemy's ships. It is now established that the superiority in
these details, which the Americans certainly enjoyed, was not
great, and not of itself enough to account for their victories.
Of course, if superiority in mere _matériel_, beyond a certain
well-understood amount, is possessed by one of two combatants,
his antagonist can hardly escape defeat; but it was never alleged
that size of ship or calibre of guns--greater within reasonable
limits than we had--necessarily led to the defeat of British
ships by the French or Spaniards. In the words of Admiral Jurien
de la Gravière, 'The ships of the United States constantly fought
with the chances in their favour.' All this is indisputable.
Nevertheless we ought to see to it that in any future war our
sea-power, great as it may be, does not receive shocks like those