effective blockades of the Confederate ports, and severed their
communications with the outside world. Indispensable articles of
equipment could not be obtained, and the armies, consequently,
became less and less able to cope with their abundantly furnished
antagonists. By dominating the rivers the Federals cut the
Confederacy asunder; and by the power they possessed of moving troops
by sea at will, perplexed and harassed the defence, and facilitated
the occupation of important points. Meanwhile the Confederates
could make no reply on the water except by capturing merchant
vessels, by which the contest was embittered, but the course of
the war remained absolutely unaffected. The great numbers of
men under arms on shore, the terrific slaughter in many battles
of a war in which tactical ability, even in a moderate degree,
was notably uncommon on both sides, and the varying fortunes of
the belligerents, made the land campaigns far more interesting
to the ordinary observer than the naval. It is not surprising,
therefore, that peace had been re-established for several years
before the American people could be made to see the great part
taken by the navy in the restoration of the Union; and what the
Americans had not seen was hidden from the sight of other nations.

In several great wars in Europe waged since France and England
made peace with Russia sea-power manifested itself but little.
In the Russo-Turkish war the great naval superiority of the Turks
in the Black Sea, where the Russians at the time had no fleet,
governed the plans, if not the course, of the campaigns. The
water being denied to them, the Russians were compelled to execute
their plan of invading Turkey by land. An advance to the Bosphorus
through the northern part of Asia Minor was impracticable without
help from a navy on the right flank. Consequently the only route