[Footnote 54: _The_First_Dutch_War_ (Navy Records Society), 1899.]

The necessity of the foregoing short account of the 'Sovereignty
or Dominion of the Seas' will be apparent as soon as we come
to the consideration of the first struggle, or rather series
of struggles, for the command of the sea. Gaining this was the
result of our wars with the Dutch in the seventeenth century.
At the time of the first Dutch war, 1652-54, and probably of
the later wars also, a great many people, and especially seamen,
believed that the conflict was due to a determination on our
part to retain, and on that of the Dutch to put an end to, the
English sovereignty or dominion. The obstinacy of the Dutch in
objecting to pay the old-established mark of respect to the English
flag was quite reason enough in the eyes of most Englishmen, and
probably of most Dutchmen also, to justify hostilities which
other reasons may have rendered inevitable. The remarkable thing
about the Dutch wars is that in reality what we gained was the
possibility of securing an absolute command of the sea. We came
out of the struggle a great, and in a fair way of becoming the
greatest, naval power. It is this which prompted Vice-Admiral P.
H. Colomb to hold that there are various kinds of command, such
as 'absolute or assured,' 'temporary,' 'with definite ulterior
purpose,' &c. An explanation that would make all these terms
intelligible would be voluminous and is unnecessary here. It
will be enough to say that the absolute command--of attempts
to gain which, as Colomb tells us, the Anglo-Dutch wars were
the most complete example--is nothing but an attribute of the
nation whose power on the sea is paramount. It exists and may
be visible in time of peace. The command which, as said above,
expresses a definite strategical condition is existent only in