the small extent to which it could be considered a 'regular'
force, its permanent nucleus being overwhelmingly outnumbered
by the hastily enrolled additions. Our defeats in the war of
1812 have been greatly exaggerated; but, all the same, they did
constitute rebuffs to our naval self-esteem which were highly
significant in themselves, and deserve deep attention. Rebuffs
of the kind were not confined to the sea service, and at New
Orleans our army, which numbered in its ranks soldiers of Busaco,
Fuentes de Onoro, and Salamanca, met with a serious defeat.

When the Austro-Prussian war broke out in 1866, the Austrian
commander-in-chief, General Benedek, published an order, probably
still in the remembrance of many, which officially declared the
contempt for the enemy felt in the Imperial army. Even those
who perceived that the Prussian forces were not fit subjects of
contempt counted with confidence on the victory of the Austrians.
Yet the latter never gained a considerable success in their combats
with the Prussians; and within a few weeks from the beginning of
hostilities the general who had assumed such a lofty tone of
superiority in speaking of his foes had to implore his sovereign
to make peace to avoid further disasters.

At the beginning of the Franco-German war of 1870, the widespread
anticipation of French victories was clearly shown by the unanimity
with which the journalists of various nationalities illustrated
their papers with maps giving the country between the French
frontier and Berlin, and omitting the part of France extending
to Paris. In less than five weeks from the opening of hostilities
events had made it certain that a map of the country to the eastward
of Lorraine would be practically useless to a student of the