secret of the colonists' success was the incapacity of the English
generals, trained in the stiff Prussian system soon to perish
at Jena, to adapt themselves to new conditions of warfare.' He
pointed out that the effect of this uncritical imitation of what
was foreign was again experienced by men 'full of admiration
of a newer German system.' We may not be able to explain what
it is, but, all the same, there does exist something which we
call national characteristics. The aim of all training should
be to utilise these to the full, not to ignore them. The naval
methods of a continental state with relatively small oceanic
interests, or with but a brief experience of securing these,
cannot be very applicable to a great maritime state whose chief
interests have been on the seas for many years.

How is all this applicable to the ultimate efficiency of the
British Navy? It may be allowed that there is a good deal of
truth in what has been written above; but it may be said that
considerations sententiously presented cannot claim to have much
practical value so long as they are absolute and unapplied. The
statement cannot be disputed. It is unquestionably necessary
to make the application. The changes in naval _matériel_, so
often spoken of, introduced within the last fifty years have been
rivalled by the changes in the composition of the British Navy.
The human element remains in original individual character exactly
the same as it always was; but there has been a great change in
the opportunities and facilities offered for the development of
the faculties most desired in men-of-war's men. All reform--using
the word in its true sense of alteration, and not in its strained
sense of improvement--has been in the direction of securing perfect
uniformity. If we take the particular directly suggested by the