in the end annihilates them, and their not having yet entirely
disappeared gives no ground for doubting their eventual, and even
near, extinction. The aptitudes still universally most prized
in the seaman were produced and nourished by practices and under
conditions no longer allowed to prevail. Should we lose those
aptitudes, are we likely to reach the position in war gained
by our predecessors?

For the British Empire the matter is vital: success in maritime
war, decisive and overwhelming, is indispensable to our existence.
We have to consider the desirability of 'taking stock' of our
moral, as well as of our material, naval equipment: to ascertain
where the accumulated effect of repeated innovations has carried
us. The mere fact of completing the investigation will help us to
rate at their true value the changes which have been introduced;
will show us what to retain, what to reject, and what to substitute.
There is no essential vagueness in these allusions. If they seem
vague, it is because the moment for particularising has not yet
come. The public opinion of the navy must first be turned in the
right direction. It must be led to question the soundness of
the basis on which many present methods rest. Having once begun
to do this, we shall find no difficulty in settling, in detail
and with precision, what the true elements of naval efficiency
are.




IV[59]