For instance, he will set out to inquire whether Leibnitz was not for
some time a follower of Spinoza, and questions of a like nature. The
curious student of such matters may find conspicuous examples of what
I mean in Herbart's _Analytical Elucidation of Morality and Natural
Right_, and in the same author's _Letters on Freedom_. Surprise may
be felt that a man of the kind should put himself to so much trouble;
for, on the face of it, if he would only examine the matter for
himself, he would speedily attain his object by the exercise of a
little thought. But there is a small difficulty in the way. It does
not depend upon his own will. A man can always sit down and read, but
not--think. It is with thoughts as with men; they cannot always be
summoned at pleasure; we must wait for them to come. Thought about a
subject must appear of itself, by a happy and harmonious combination
of external stimulus with mental temper and attention; and it is just
that which never seems to come to these people.

This truth may be illustrated by what happens in the case of matters
affecting our own personal interest. When it is necessary to come to
some resolution in a matter of that kind, we cannot well sit down at
any given moment and think over the merits of the case and make up our
mind; for, if we try to do so, we often find ourselves unable, at that
particular moment, to keep our mind fixed upon the subject; it wanders
off to other things. Aversion to the matter in question is sometimes
to blame for this. In such a case we should not use force, but wait
for the proper frame of mind to come of itself. It often comes
unexpectedly and returns again and again; and the variety of temper in
which we approach it at different moments puts the matter always in a
fresh light. It is this long process which is understood by the term
_a ripe resolution._ For the work of coming to a resolution must be
distributed; and in the process much that is overlooked at one moment