the Hellenic society, the choicest that the world has seen, the
completest, that is, at once in sensibilities and in energies, could
not but show the excellence of its sensibilities in receiving moral
impressions, the excellence of its energies in achieving moral
conduct.

This, however, is no place to discuss at length questions in the
history of ethics. Yet it must be remembered that in the ancient world
departments of thought, and the affairs of men generally, were far
less specialized than in modern times. If the philosophy of Hellas be
the most explicit witness to her ethical development, her poetry
is the most eloquent. And scarcely at any time, scarcely even in
Aristotle, did Hellenic philosophy in any department lose most
significant traces of its poetical ancestry. But enough here if I have
succeeded in pointing out that in the great poet with whom we are
concerned there is an ethical as well as a poetical and historical
interest, supplying one more reason against neglect of his legacy of
song.

Yet indeed even now there remains a further question which to the
mind of any one who at present labours in this field of classical
scholarship must recur persistently if not depressingly, and on which
it is natural if not necessary to say a few words. If the selection
of Pindar in particular as a Greek poet with claims to be further
popularized among Englishmen may be defended, there is still a more
general count to which all who make endeavours to attract or retain
attention to Greek literature will in these times be called upon to
plead by voices which command respect. To such pleas this is not the
place to give large room, or to discriminate in detail between the
reasonable and unreasonable elements in the attacks on a system of