in the choice of ministers, etc., equally with the meanest of his
subjects in his particular duty. The personal character of our present
amiable sovereign makes us easy and happy that so great a power is
lodged in such hands; but the favorite has given too just cause for him
to escape the general odium. The prerogative of the crown is to exert
the constitutional power intrusted to it in such a way, not of blind
favor and partiality, but of wisdom and judgment. This is the spirit of
our constitution. The people, too, have their prerogative; and I hope
the fine words of Dryden will be engraven on our hearts, 'Freedom is the
English subject's prerogative.'"

These were the last sentences of No. 45. And in the present day it will
hardly be thought that, however severe or even violent some of the
epithets with which certain sentences of the royal speech were assailed
may have been, the language exceeds the bounds of allowable political
criticism. With respect to the King, indeed, however accompanied with
personal compliments to himself those strictures may have been, it may
be admitted that in asserting any responsibility whatever to the people
on the part of the sovereign, even for the choice of his ministers, as
being bound to exercise that choice "with wisdom and judgment," it goes
somewhat beyond the strict theory of the constitution. Undoubtedly that
theory is, that the minister chosen by the King is himself responsible
for every circumstance or act which led to his appointment. This
principle was established in the fullest manner in 1834, when, as will
be seen hereafter, Sir Robert Peel admitted his entire responsibility
for the dismissal of Lord Melbourne by King William IV., though it was
notorious that he was in Italy at the time, and had not been consulted
on the matter. But as yet such questions had not been as accurately
examined as subsequent events caused them to be; and Wilkes's assertion
of royal responsibility to this extent probably coincided with the