the people from his Majesty, and to excite them to traitorous
insurrections against the government." Wilkes instantly sued out a writ
of _habeas corpus_, and was without hesitation released by the Court of
Common Pleas, on the legal ground that, "as a member of the House of
Commons, he was protected from arrest in all cases except treason,
felony, or a breach of the peace;" a decision which, in the next session
of Parliament, the minister endeavored to overbear by inducing both
Houses to concur in a resolution that "privilege of Parliament did not
extend to the case of publishing seditious libels."

In his life of Lord Camden,[7] who was Chief-justice of the Common Pleas
at the time, Lord Campbell expresses a warm approval of this resolution,
as one "which would now be considered conclusive evidence of the law."
But, with all respect to the memory of a writer who was himself a
Chief-justice, we suspect that in this case he was advancing a position
as an author engaged in the discussion of what had become a party
question, which he would not have laid down from the Bench.[8] The
resolution certainly did not make it law, since it was not confirmed by
any royal assent; and to interpret the law is not within the province of
the House of Commons, nor, except when sitting as a Court of Appeal, of
the House of Lords. We may, however, fully agree with the principle
which Lord Campbell at the same time lays down, that "privilege of
Parliament should not be permitted to interfere with the execution of
the criminal law of the country." And this doctrine has been so fully
acquiesced in since, that members of both Houses have in more than one
instance been imprisoned on conviction for libel.

The legality of the species of warrant under which Wilkes had been
arrested was, however, a question of far greater importance; and on that
no formal decision was pronounced on this occasion, the Lieutenant of