sufficiently compliant for his purposes. Mr. De Grey's argument was of a
different character, being based on what he foretold would be the
practical result of a decision that expulsion did not involve an
incapacity to be re-elected. If it did not involve such incapacity, and
if, in consequence, Mr. Wilkes should be re-elected, he considered that
the House would naturally feel it its duty to re-expel him as often as
the constituency re-elected him. But one answer given to this argument
was, that to expel a second time would be to punish twice for one
offence, a proceeding at variance not only with English law but with
every idea of justice. Another, and one which has obtained greater
acceptance, was, that the legitimate doctrine was, that the issue of a
new writ gave the expelled member an appeal from the House to the
constituency, and that the constituency had a constitutional right to
overrule the judgment of the House, and to determine whether it still
regarded the candidate as its most suitable representative.

The ministers, however, were, as before, strong enough in the House to
carry their resolution. But the Opposition returned to the charge,
taking up an entirely different though equally general position, "That,
by the law of the land and the known law and usage of Parliament, no
person eligible by common right can be incapacitated by vote or
resolution of this House, but by act of Parliament only." It is
remarkable that, in the debate which ensued, two members who
successively rose to the dignity of Lord Chancellor, Mr. Thurlow and Mr.
Wedderburn, took different sides; but nothing could shake the
ministerial majority. The resolution was rejected. And when Lord
Rockingham proposed the same resolution in the House of Lords, though it
was supported by all the eloquence of Lord Chatham, he was beaten by a
majority of more than two to one, and the ministers even carried a
resolution declaring "that any interference of the House of Lords with