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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
page 32 of 302 (10%)
1882. He entered in fact into a defensive agreement with Russia against
Austria. While he increased the war strength of the army, he openly
announced that Germany would always stand on the defensive; and he
addressed a warning to the Reichstag against the 'offensive-defensive'
policy which was even then in the air, though it was still far from its
triumph:--

'If I were to say to you, "We are threatened by France and Russia;
it is better for us to fight at once; an offensive war is more
advantageous to us," and ask for a credit of a hundred millions, I
do not know whether you would grant it--I hope not.'[10]

But Bismarck's retirement (1890) left the conduct of German policy in
less cautious hands. The defensive alliance with Russia was allowed to
lapse; friction between the two Powers increased, and as the result
Germany found herself confronted with the Dual Alliance of France and
Russia, which gradually developed, during the years 1891-6, from a
friendly understanding into a formal contract for mutual defence. There
is no doubt that this alliance afforded France a protection against that
unprovoked attack upon her eastern frontier which she has never ceased
to dread since 1875; and it has yet to be proved that she ever abused
the new strength which this alliance gave her.

It is only in the field of colonial expansion that she has shown
aggressive tendencies since 1896; and even here the members of the
Triple Alliance have never shown serious cause for a belief that France
has invaded their lawful spheres of interest. Her advance in Morocco was
permitted by Italy and Spain; her vast dominion in French West Africa
has been recognized by treaties with Germany and England; in East Africa
she has Madagascar, of which her possession has never been disputed by
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