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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
page 50 of 302 (16%)

From these facts, viewed in their chronological order, it is clear that
on sea as on land Germany has set the pace. Thirty years ago the German
navy did not enter into England's naval calculations. For the last six
years, if not for a longer period, it has been the one navy which our
Admiralty felt the necessity of watching from year to year, and indeed
from month to month. It is the first time for more than a hundred years
that we have had to face the problem of 'a powerful homogeneous navy
under one government and concentrated within easy distance of our
shores.'

On German principles we should long ago have adopted the
'offensive-defensive.' We have been at least as seriously menaced by
Germany at sea as Germany has been menaced by Russia upon land. But we
can confidently say that in the period of rivalry our fleet has never
been used as a threat, or turned to the purposes of an aggressive
colonial policy. Rightly or wrongly, we have refused to make possible
intentions a case for an ultimatum. We have held by the position that
only a breach of public law would justify us in abandoning our efforts
for the peace of Europe.

NOTE

_Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_.

In April, 1904, England and France concluded an agreement for the
delimitation of their interests on the Mediterranean littoral of North
Africa. The agreement included five secret Articles which were not
published until November, 1911. The purport of the Articles which were
published at the time was as follows. By the first Article England
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