Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
page 61 of 302 (20%)
page 61 of 302 (20%)
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Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France,
England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; and Italy and France were ready to co-operate with England.[33] Germany, however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia consented to it.[34] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukase ordering mobilization,[35] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna.[36] This offer was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but subsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progress between the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1.[37] No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28, the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July 29.[38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances that she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] these assurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendly settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals for peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and July 31.[40] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian mobilization was alarming, and that France was also making military preparations;[41] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim 'imminent state of war' (_drohende Kriegsgefahr_) as a counter measure to the French preparations;[42] German military preparations, by July |
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