Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
page 89 of 302 (29%)
page 89 of 302 (29%)
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'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis
safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately ... The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this crisis ... be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow will make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.' Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned that France should not be crushed, and that the neutrality of Belgium should not be violated. It is interesting to note how this extremely serious warning was received by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg:--'His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... that he received your communication without a comment.'[111] But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could scarcely complain that no warning had been given to him. With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any deduction as to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but it may be remarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San Giuliano told Sir Rennell Rodd that he had 'good reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.'[112] |
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