which he was so justly praised for adopting in 1912, that England had no
direct interest in Balkan disputes, but that it was her bounden duty to
prevent a European conflagration. He quickly saw, what Germany would not
see, that Russia was so much interested in Servia, for both political
and religious reasons, that any attempt by the Austro-Hungarian
Government to coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial integrity
or independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably rouse Russia to
military action. For Russia had greater interests in the security of
Servia than Great Britain had in the security of Belgium. In each case
the Great Power was bound by honour and self-interest alike to interfere
to protect the smaller Power, but Russia was also bound to Servia by
racial and religious bonds. This being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself,
not as the German White Book says[131] to localize the conflict, but to
prevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia which
would inevitably involve Russia and probably other European powers. He
stated his policy with the greatest clearness in the House of Commons on
July 27th, but he had already acted on the lines of the policy which he
then explained. On July 24th he told Count Mensdorff that he would
concern himself

'with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the
peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and
Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government[132].'

In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he told the German
Ambassador:--

'If the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to
trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves
about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum