are most fit to have charge of a thing, who least desire to pervert it
to their own ends. And, doubtless, if we examine the aims which the
nobles and the commons respectively set before them, we shall find in
the former a great desire to dominate, in the latter merely a desire not
to be dominated over, and hence a greater attachment to freedom, since
they have less to gain than the others by destroying it. Wherefore, when
the commons are put forward as the defenders of liberty, they may be
expected to take better care of it, and, as they have no desire to
tamper with it themselves, to be less apt to suffer others to do so.

On the other hand, he who defends the method followed by the Spartans
and Venetians, may urge, that by confiding this guardianship to the
nobles, two desirable ends are served: first, that from being allowed to
retain in their own hands a weapon which makes them the stronger party
in the State, the ambition of this class is more fully satisfied; and,
second, that an authority is withdrawn from the unstable multitude which
as used by them is likely to lead to endless disputes and tumults, and
to drive the nobles into dangerous and desperate courses. In instance
whereof might be cited the case of Rome itself, wherein the tribunes of
the people being vested with this authority, not content to have one
consul a plebeian, insisted on having both; and afterwards laid claim
to the censorship, the prætorship and all the other magistracies in
the city. Nor was this enough for them, but, carried away by the same
factious spirit, they began after a time to pay court to such men as
they thought able to attack the nobility, and so gave occasion to the
rise of Marius and the overthrow of Rome.

Wherefore one who weighs both sides of the question well, might hesitate
which party he should choose as the guardian of public liberty, being
uncertain which class is more mischievous in a commonwealth, that which