dissensions which arise between commons and senate, looking on them as
evils which cannot be escaped if we would arrive at the greatness of
Rome.

In connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority
of the tribunes was essential in Rome to the guardianship of freedom, we
may naturally go on to show what advantages result to a republic from
the power of impeachment; which, together with others, was conferred
upon the tribunes; a subject to be noticed in the following Chapter.



CHAPTER VII.--_That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist the
Right to accuse._

To those set forward in a commonwealth as guardians of public freedom,
no more useful or necessary authority can be given than the power to
accuse, either before the people, or before some council or tribunal,
those citizens who in any way have offended against the liberty of their
country.

A law of this kind has two effects most beneficial to a State: _first,_
that the citizens from fear of being accused, do not engage in attempts
hurtful to the State, or doing so, are put down at once and without
respect of persons: and _next,_ that a vent is given for the escape of
all those evil humours which, from whatever cause, gather in cities
against particular citizens; for unless an outlet be duly provided for
these by the laws, they flow into irregular channels and overwhelm the
State. There is nothing, therefore, which contributes so much to
the stability and permanence of a State, as to take care that the