senators, so that the equites should have twice as much power as the
Senate itself. This at first sight seems nonsense. But Caius may have
proposed that for judicial purposes 600 equites should form, as it
were, a second chamber, which, being twice as numerous, would permit
two judices for every senatorial judex. In form he may have devised
that 'counter-senate,' which, as it has been shown, he in fact
created. [Sidenote: The effects of it. The Senate abased, the equites
exalted.] But whether Caius provided that all the judices or only
two-thirds of them should be chosen from the equites, and in whatever
way he did so, he did succeed in exalting the moneyed class and
abasing the Senate. In civil processes, and in the permanent and
temporary commissions for the administration of justice, the equites
were henceforth supreme. Even the senators themselves depended on
their verdict for acquittal or condemnation, and the chief power in
the State had changed hands. Of course the change would not be felt
at once to the full; but this was the most trenchant stroke which
Gracchus aimed at the Senate's power. Here, again, it is customary to
write of his actions as if they were governed solely by feeling, quite
apart from all considerations of right and wrong. But Cicero declares
that for nearly fifty years, while the equites discharged this office,
there was not even the slightest suspicion of a single eques being
bribed in his capacity as judex; and after every allowance has been
made for Ciceronian exaggeration, the statement may at least warrant
us in believing that Gracchus had some reason for hoping that his
change would be a change for the better, even if, as Appian declares,
it turned out in the end just the opposite. Indeed, it is beyond
question that, as the provinces were governed by the senatorial class,
judices who had to decide cases like those of Cotta would be more
fairly chosen from the equites than from the class to which Cotta
belonged.