safety, and if he undertakes to impose a check on them, he cannot do so
justly. What then shall he do with them? How shall he treat them? If you
root out their families, diminish their wealth, humble their pride, you
will lose the good-will of your subjects. How can it be otherwise, if no
one is permitted to be born nobly or to grow rich honestly or to become
strong, brave, or learned? But if you allow all the separate classes to
grow strong, you will not be able to deal with them easily. If you alone
were sufficient for carrying on politics and war well and opportunely,
and needed no assistant for any of them, it would be a different story.
As the case stands, however, it is quite essential for you to have many
helpers, since they must govern so large a world: and they all ought
to be both brave and prudent. Now if you hand over the legions and
the offices to such men, there will be danger that both you and your
government will be overthrown. It is not possible for a valuable man to
be produced without good sense, and he cannot acquire any great good
sense from servile practices. But again, if he becomes a man of sense, he
cannot fail to desire liberty and to hate all masters. If, on the other
hand, you entrust nothing to these men, but put affairs in charge of the
worthless and chance comers, you will very quickly incur the anger of the
first class, who think themselves distrusted, and you will very quickly
fail in the greatest enterprises. What good could an ignorant or low-born
person accomplish? What enemy would not hold him in contempt? What allies
would obey him? Who, even of the soldiers themselves, would not disdain
to be ruled by such a man? What evils are wont to result from such a
condition I do not need to describe to you, for you know them thoroughly.
I feel obliged to say only this, that if such an assistant did nothing
right, he would injure you far more than the enemy: if he did anything
satisfactorily, his lack of education would cause him to lose his head,
and he would be a terror to you.