A naval power, next to the militia, is the natural defense of the United
States. The experience of the last war would be sufficient to shew that
a moderate naval force, such as would be easily within the present
abilities of the Union, would have been sufficient to have baffled many
formidable transportations of troops from one State to another, which
were then practiced. Our seacoasts, from their great extent, are more
easily annoyed and more easily defended by a naval force than any other.
With all the materials our country abounds; in skill our naval
architects and navigators are equal to any, and commanders and seamen
will not be wanting.

But although the establishment of a permanent system of naval defense
appears to be requisite, I am sensible it can not be formed so speedily
and extensively as the present crisis demands. Hitherto I have thought
proper to prevent the sailing of armed vessels except on voyages to the
East Indies, where general usage and the danger from pirates appeared to
render the permission proper. Yet the restriction has originated solely
from a wish to prevent collisions with the powers at war, contravening
the act of Congress of June, 1794, and not from any doubt entertained by
me of the policy and propriety of permitting our vessels to employ means
of defense while engaged in a lawful foreign commerce. It remains for
Congress to prescribe such regulations as will enable our seafaring
citizens to defend themselves against violations of the law of nations,
and at the same time restrain them from committing acts of hostility
against the powers at war. In addition to this voluntary provision for
defense by individual citizens, it appears to me necessary to equip the
frigates, and provide other vessels of inferior force, to take under
convoy such merchant vessels as shall remain unarmed.