commandant of the place at Berlin during the French occupation, was obliged
to cashier him publicly on the parade and to cause his epaulettes to be
torn from his coat in order to mark the disgust and indignation that he and
all the French officers felt at the base ingratitude of this man.

This work, "Vertraute Briefe" (confidential letters), contains much curious
matter and very interesting anecdotes respecting the corruption, venality
and depravation that prevailed in the Prussian Court and army previous to
the war in 1806. Let this suffice to show that the Prussians have not so
much reason to complain against the French as they pretend to have;
besides, the conduct of the Prussian Government itself was so vacillating
and contradictory that they had themselves only to blame for what they
suffered. They should have supported Austria in 1805. But the fact is that
the vanity and the _amour propre_ of the Prussian military were so hurt at
the humiliation they experienced at and after the battle of Jena that it
was this that has embittered them so much against the French.

Let it not, however, be supposed for a moment that I seek to excuse or
palliate the conduct of Napoleon towards Prussia. I have always thought it
not only unjust but impolitic. Impolitic, because Prussia was, and ought
always to be, the obvious and natural ally of France, and Napoleon, instead
of endeavouring to crush that power, should have aggrandized her and made
her the paramount power in Germany. It was in fact his obvious policy to
cede Hanover in perpetuity to Prussia, and have rendered thereby the breach
between the Houses of Brandenburgh and Hanover irreparable and
irreconcilable. This would have thrown Prussia necessarily into the arms
of France, in whose system she must then have moved, and all British
influence on the Continent would have been effectually put an end to.
Another prime fault of Napoleon was that he did not crush and dismember
Austria in 1809 as he had it in his power to do; and by so doing he would