This law, it is obvious, had two objects. The first was to make it a
penal offense in all officers and magistrates of the Commonwealth to
exercise the powers conferred on them by the act of Congress of the 12th
of February, 1793, entitled "An act respecting fugitives from justice
and persons escaping from the service of their masters," and which
powers they were fully competent to perform up to the time of this
inhibition and penal enactment; second, to refuse the use of the jails
of the State for the detention of any person claimed as a fugitive
slave.

It is deeply to be lamented that the purpose of these enactments is
quite apparent. It was to prevent, as far as the legislature of the
State could prevent, the laws of Congress passed for the purpose of
carrying into effect that article of the Constitution of the United
States which declares that "no person held to service or labor in
one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in
consequence of any law or regulation therein be discharged from such
service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party
to whom such service or labor may be due" from being carried into
effect. But these acts of State legislation, although they may cause
embarrassment and create expense, can not derogate either from the duty
or the authority of Congress to carry out fully and fairly the plain and
imperative constitutional provision for the delivery of persons bound to
labor in one State and escaping into another to the party to whom such
labor may be due. It is quite clear that by the resolution of Congress
of March 3, 1821, the marshal of the United States in any State in which
the use of the jails of the State has been withdrawn, in whole or in
part, from the purpose of the detention of persons committed under the
authority of the United States is not only empowered, but expressly
required, under the direction of the judge of the district, to hire