But all this is plainly an affair of psychology. So inevitable is this
that a truly formal Ideal of 'Logic' would exclude all judgment whatever
from the complete system of 'eternal' Truth. For from such a system no
part could be rightly extracted to stand alone. Such a selection could
be effected and justified only by the exigencies of a human thinker.

The impotent verbalism of the formal treatment of judgment appears in
another way when the question is raised _how_ a 'true' judgment is to be
distinguished from a 'false.' For the logician, if his public will not
accept either the relegation of this distinction to 'psychology' or the
proper formal answer that _all_ judgments are (formally) 'true' and even
'infallible,' can think of nothing better to say than that if the
'judgment' is not true it was not a 'true judgment,' but a false
'opinion' which may be abandoned to 'psychology.'[G] Apparently he is
not concerned to help men to discriminate between 'judgments' and
'opinions,' or even to show that true 'judgments' do in fact occur.



3. Inference involves Formal Logic in a host of difficulties.

_(a)_ If it is not to be a verbal manipulation of phrases whose coming
together is not inquired into, it must be a connected train of thought.
But such a connection of thoughts cannot be conceived or understood
without reference to the purpose of a reasoner, who _selects_ what he
requires from the totality of 'truths.' If, then, 'Logic' has merely to
contemplate this eternal and immutable system of truth in its integrity,
and forbids all selection from it for a merely human purpose, how can it
either justify, or even understand, the drawing of any inference
whatever?