My scheme was to advance one company of Czech troops from Khamerovka to
Olhanka, the Ataman's most forward post on my right front, where they
were to prepare a small entrenched camp. I would also advance 200
infantry with two machine guns the first night from Kraevesk to
Khamerovka.

The next day I ordered 200 men to entrain from Spascoe to Kraevesk to
act as a reserve. They were to night march to Khamerovka, and occupy the
place of my forward party, who would advance by night and join the
Cossacks and Czech troops at Olhanka. I would be with the advanced group
and make a daylight examination of the post to be attacked, and be
joined at night by my second detachment from Khamerovka. By this means I
should have had 400 British rifles, a machine-gun section of forty-three
men with four maxims, a company of Czech infantry of about 200 men, and
last, but by no means least, Ataman Kalmakoff with about 400 Cossack
cavalry--a total of about 1,000 men. I ordered the two roads along which
any reinforcements for the enemy post must pass to be patrolled at night
and also closely observed during the day.

I had drawn up my plan of attack and the first stage of the operation
had actually been executed, when I was brought to a sudden standstill by
a piece of fussy interference.

There was no linguist in my battalion capable of speaking Russian
sufficiently well for my purpose, hence I had to seek the services of an
agent of the British Military Representative at "Vlady." This agent
returned to "Vlady" directly the necessary arrangements for the attack
had been completed. I ought to have compelled him to remain with me, but
as he appeared to favour the proposed forward movement I did not scent
any danger to my purely defensive policy. He did not wait until he had