part in the operations.

The first promise of help and its countermanding had placed us in an
extremely dangerous situation. We had left our positions once, and
nothing but the lack of vigilance on the part of the enemy had enabled
us to reoccupy them without fighting. Our movements must have been seen,
and though he had not understood them till too late to take full
advantage the first time, that he would allow us to get away so easily
again seemed to us to be very unlikely. In fact, it appeared as though
we had been sacrificed to give a clear field for some manoeuvre or
purpose which we could not understand.

Our conference was a very urgent one, and for a time Major Pichon
thought it best to hang on to our positions and trust to someone making
an effort for our relief. Had British or American troops been collecting
in our rear, we would not have hesitated a moment to remain, for we
should have been certain of immediate help.

We knew that a battalion of Czech infantry had been moved up from
Svagena towards Antonovka to threaten the enemy's outflanking columns,
and that this battalion had made it a dangerous proceeding for the enemy
to close in on our rear. Hence we decided to withdraw certain units to
Svagena, and for the remainder to retire to a position at Dukoveskoie
and make a new line from the railway through that village, thus linking
up with the Czech troops who had marched to our assistance; they would
thus become the extreme right of our new line.

This movement would enable the Japanese 12th Division at Svagena to
continue their deployment behind our screen, and if the enemy continued
his outflanking tactics would involve the Japanese in the fighting