the existence of the late bank, or secure us against future suspensions.
In 1825 an effort was made by the Bank of England to curtail the issues
of the country banks under the most favorable circumstances. The paper
currency had been expanded to a ruinous extent, and the bank put forth
all its power to contract it in order to reduce prices and restore the
equilibrium of the foreign exchanges. It accordingly commenced a system
of curtailment of its loans and issues, in the vain hope that the joint
stock and private banks of the Kingdom would be compelled to follow its
example. It found, however, that as it contracted they expanded, and at
the end of the process, to employ the language of a very high official
authority, "whatever reduction of the paper circulation was effected by
the Bank of England (in 1825) was more than made up by the issues of the
country banks."

But a bank of the United States would not, if it could, restrain the
issues and loans of the State banks, because its duty as a regulator
of the currency must often be in direct conflict with the immediate
interest of its stockholders. If we expect one agent to restrain or
control another, their interests must, at least in some degree, be
antagonistic. But the directors of a bank of the United States would
feel the same interest and the same inclination with the directors of
the State banks to expand the currency, to accommodate their favorites
and friends with loans, and to declare large dividends. Such has been
our experience in regard to the last bank.

After all, we must mainly rely upon the patriotism and wisdom of the
States for the prevention and redress of the evil. If they will afford
us a real specie basis for our paper circulation by increasing the
denomination of bank notes, first to twenty and afterwards to fifty
dollars; if they will require that the banks shall at all times keep on