extensive coast of Central America, sweeping round from the Rio Hondo to
the port and harbor of San Juan de Nicaragua, together with the adjacent
Bay Islands, except the comparatively small portion of this between the
Sarstoon and Cape Honduras. According to their construction, the treaty
does no more than simply prohibit them from extending their possessions
in Central America beyond the present limits. It is not too much to
assert that if in the United States the treaty had been considered
susceptible of such a construction it never would have been negotiated
under the authority of the President, nor would it have received the
approbation of the Senate. The universal conviction in the United States
was that when our Government consented to violate its traditional and
time-honored policy and to stipulate with a foreign government never to
occupy or acquire territory in the Central American portion of our own
continent, the consideration for this sacrifice was that Great Britain
should, in this respect at least, be placed in the same position with
ourselves. Whilst we have no right to doubt the sincerity of the British
Government in their construction of the treaty, it is at the same time
my deliberate conviction that this construction is in opposition both
to its letter and its spirit.

Under the late Administration negotiations were instituted between
the two Governments for the purpose, if possible, of removing these
difficulties, and a treaty having this laudable object in view was
signed at London on the 17th October, 1856, and was submitted by the
President to the Senate on the following 10th of December. Whether
this treaty, either in its original or amended form, would have
accomplished the object intended without giving birth to new and
embarrassing complications between the two Governments, may perhaps
be well questioned. Certain it is, however, it was rendered much less
objectionable by the different amendments made to it by the Senate. The