It is, perhaps, fortunate that the question has never arisen.

The British Government, immediately after rejecting the treaty as
amended, proposed to enter into a new treaty with the United States,
similar in all respects to the treaty which they had just refused to
ratify, if the United States would consent to add to the Senate's clear
and unqualified recognition of the sovereignty of Honduras over the Bay
Islands the following conditional stipulation:

Whenever and so soon as the Republic of Honduras shall have concluded
and ratified a treaty with Great Britain by which Great Britain shall
have ceded and the Republic of Honduras shall have accepted the said
islands, subject to the provisions and conditions contained in such
treaty.

This proposition was, of course, rejected. After the Senate had refused
to recognize the British convention with Honduras of the 27th August,
1856, with full knowledge of its contents, it was impossible for me,
necessarily ignorant of "the provisions and conditions" which might be
contained in a future convention between the same parties, to sanction
them in advance.

The fact is that when two nations like Great Britain and the United
States, mutually desirous, as they are, and I trust ever may be,
of maintaining the most friendly relations with each other, have
unfortunately concluded a treaty which they understand in senses
directly opposite, the wisest course is to abrogate such a treaty by
mutual consent and to commence anew. Had this been done promptly,
all difficulties in Central America would most probably ere this have
been adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties. The time spent in