the authority of Congress. They refused to vote for delegates to the
convention, not because, from circumstances which I need not detail,
there was an omission to register the comparatively few voters who were
inhabitants of certain counties of Kansas in the early spring of 1857,
but because they had predetermined at all hazards to adhere to their
revolutionary organization and defeat the establishment of any other
constitution than that which they had framed at Topeka. The election was
therefore suffered to pass by default. But of this result the qualified
electors who refused to vote can never justly complain.

From this review it is manifest that the Lecompton convention, according
to every principle of constitutional law, was legally constituted and
was invested with power to frame a constitution.

The sacred principle of popular sovereignty has been invoked in favor
of the enemies of law and order in Kansas. But in what manner is
popular sovereignty to be exercised in this country if not through
the instrumentality of established law? In certain small republics
of ancient times the people did assemble in primary meetings, passed
laws, and directed public affairs. In our country this is manifestly
impossible. Popular sovereignty can be exercised here only through the
ballot box; and if the people will refuse to exercise it in this manner,
as they have done in Kansas at the election of delegates, it is not for
them to complain that their rights have been violated.

The Kansas convention, thus lawfully constituted, proceeded to frame a
constitution, and, having completed their work, finally adjourned on the
7th day of November last. They did not think proper to submit the whole
of this constitution to a popular vote, but they did submit the question
whether Kansas should be a free or a slave State to the people. This was