greatly augmented the desire, long existing among the people of the
United States, to separate the fiscal operations of the Government from
those of individuals or corporations.

Again to create a national bank as a fiscal agent would be to
disregard the popular will, twice solemnly and unequivocally expressed.
On no question of domestic policy is there stronger evidence that the
sentiments of a large majority are deliberately fixed, and I can not
concur with those who think they see in recent events a proof that these
sentiments are, or a reason that they should be, changed.

Events similar in their origin and character have heretofore frequently
occurred without producing any such change, and the lessons of
experience must be forgotten if we suppose that the present overthrow of
credit would have been prevented by the existence of a national bank.
Proneness to excessive issues has ever been the vice of the banking
system--a vice as prominent in national as in State institutions. This
propensity is as subservient to the advancement of private interests
in the one as in the other, and those who direct them both, being
principally guided by the same views and influenced by the same motives,
will be equally ready to stimulate extravagance of enterprise by
improvidence of credit. How strikingly is this conclusion sustained
by experience! The Bank of the United States, with the vast powers
conferred on it by Congress, did not or could not prevent former and
similar embarrassments, nor has the still greater strength it has been
said to possess under its present charter enabled it in the existing
emergency to check other institutions or even to save itself. In Great
Britain, where it has been seen the same causes have been attended with
the same effects, a national bank possessing powers far greater than are
asked for by the warmest advocates of such an institution here has also