hasten the revulsion in which at length they, in common with the other
banks, were fatally involved.

Under these circumstances it becomes our solemn duty to inquire whether
there are not in any connection between the Government and banks of
issue evils of great magnitude, inherent in its very nature and against
which no precautions can effectually guard.

Unforeseen in the organization of the Government and forced on the
Treasury by early necessities, the practice of employing banks was in
truth from the beginning more a measure of emergency than of sound
policy. When we started into existence as a nation, in addition to the
burdens of the new Government we assumed all the large but honorable
load of debt which was the price of our liberty; but we hesitated to
weigh down the infant industry of the country by resorting to adequate
taxation for the necessary revenue. The facilities of banks, in return
for the privileges they acquired, were promptly offered, and perhaps too
readily received by an embarrassed Treasury. During the long continuance
of a national debt and the intervening difficulties of a foreign war the
connection was continued from motives of convenience; but these causes
have long since passed away. We have no emergencies that make banks
necessary to aid the wants of the Treasury; we have no load of national
debt to provide for, and we have on actual deposit a large surplus. No
public interest, therefore, now requires the renewal of a connection
that circumstances have dissolved. The complete organization of our
Government, the abundance of our resources, the general harmony which
prevails between the different States and with foreign powers, all
enable us now to select the system most consistent with the Constitution
and most conducive to the public welfare. Should we, then, connect the
Treasury for a fourth time with the local banks, it can only be under a