immutable being? Do they find this perfection in the idea they have
of every atom in particular? An atom not being the same with, and
being absolutely distinguished from, another atom, each of them must
have in itself eternity and independence with respect to any other
being. Once more, is it in the idea these philosophers have of each
atom that they find this perfection? But let us grant them all they
suppose in this question, and even what they ought to be ashamed to
suppose--viz., that atoms are eternal, subsisting by themselves,
independent from any other being, and consequently entirely perfect.


SECT. LXXVIII. The Suppositions of the Epicureans are False and
Chimerical.


Must we suppose, besides, that atoms have motion of themselves?
Shall we suppose it out of gaiety to give an air of reality to a
system more chimerical than the tales of the fairies? Let us
consult the idea we have of a body. We conceive it perfectly well
without supposing it to be in motion, and represent it to us at
rest; nor is its idea in this state less clear; nor does it lose its
parts, figure, or dimensions. It is to no purpose to suppose that
all bodies are perpetually in some motion, either sensible or
insensible; and that though some parts of matter have a lesser
motion than others, yet the universal mass of matter has ever the
same motion in its totality. To speak at this rate is building
castles in the air, and imposing vain imaginations on the belief of
others; for who has told these philosophers that the mass of matter
has ever the same motion in its totality? Who has made the
experiment of it? Have they the assurance to bestow the name of