march, the enemy must either have retired at once, or have been liable
to an attack upon their right flank, when, if beaten, they would have
been driven down to the sea-shore under the guns of the ships, and
killed or captured, to a man. Unfortunately, however, owing to the
jealousies between the two generals, the illness of Marshal Arnaud,
and the incapacity of Lord Raglan, there was neither plan nor concert.
The armies simply fought as they marched, each general of division
doing his best and leading his men at that portion of the enemy's
position which happened to be opposite to him. The sole understanding
arrived at was that the armies were to march at six in the morning;
that General Bosquet's division, which was next to the sea, was,
covered by guns of the ships, to first carry the enemy's position
there; and that when he had obtained a footing upon the plateau, a
general attack was to be made. Even this plan, simple as it was, was
not fully carried out, as Lord Raglan did not move his troops till
nine in the morning. Three precious hours were therefore wasted, and a
pursuit after the battle which would have turned the defeat into a
rout was therefore prevented, and Sebastopol saved, to cost tens of
thousands of lives before it fell. The Russian position on the Alma
was along a crest of hills. On their left by the sea these rose
precipitously, offering great difficulties for an assault. Further
inland, however, the slope became easy, and towards the right centre
and right against which the English attack was directed, the hill was
simply a slope broken into natural terraces, on which were many walls
and vineyards. Near the sea the river ran between low banks, but
inland the bank was much steeper, the south side rising some thirty or
forty feet, and enabling its defenders to sweep the ground across
which the assailants must advance. While on their left the Russian
forces were not advanced in front of the hill which formed their
position, on the lower ground they occupied the vineyards and