the people, to be by them applied to the benefit of those to whom they
properly belonged. The principle and the object were to return to the
people an unavoidable surplus of revenue which might have been paid by
them under a system which could not at once be abandoned, but even this
resource, which at one time seemed to be almost the only alternative to
save the General Government from grasping unlimited power over internal
improvements, was suggested with doubts of its constitutionality.

But this bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to return to
the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid in by them, but to
create a surplus for distribution among the States. It seizes the entire
proceeds of one source of revenue and sets them apart as a surplus,
making it necessary to raise the moneys for supporting the Government
and meeting the general charges from other sources. It even throws the
entire land system upon the customs for its support, and makes the
public lands a perpetual charge upon the Treasury. It does not return
to the people moneys accidentally or unavoidably paid by them to the
Government, by which they are not wanted, but compels the people to pay
moneys into the Treasury for the mere purpose of creating a surplus for
distribution to their State governments. If this principle be once
admitted, it is not difficult to perceive to what consequences it may
lead. Already this bill, by throwing the land system on the revenues
from imports for support, virtually distributes among the States a part
of those revenues. The proportion may be increased from time to time,
without any departure from the principle now asserted, until the State
governments shall derive all the funds necessary for their support from
the Treasury of the United States, or, if a sufficient supply should be
obtained by some States and not by others, the deficient States might
complain; and to put an end to all further difficulty Congress, without
assuming any new principle, need go but one step further and put the