it will be expected of them to facilitate domestic exchanges for the
benefit of internal commerce; to grant all reasonable facilities to the
payers of the revenue; to exercise the utmost liberality toward the
other State banks, and do nothing uselessly to embarrass the Bank of
the United States.

As one of the most serious objections to the Bank of the United States
is the power which it concentrates, care must be taken in finding other
agents for the service of the Treasury not to raise up another power
equally formidable. Although it would probably be impossible to produce
such a result by any organization of the State banks which could be
devised, yet it is desirable to avoid even the appearance. To this end
it would be expedient to assume no more power over them and interfere no
more in their affairs than might be absolutely necessary to the security
of the public deposit and the faithful performance of their duties
as agents of the Treasury. Any interference by them in the political
contests of the country with a view to influence elections ought, in the
opinion of the President, to be followed by an immediate discharge from
the public service.

It is the desire of the President that the control of the banks and
the currency shall, as far as possible, be entirely separated from the
political power of the country as well as wrested from an institution
which has already attempted to subject the Government to its will.
In his opinion the action of the General Government on this subject
ought not to extend beyond the grant in the Constitution, which only
authorizes Congress "to coin money and regulate the value thereof;"
all else belongs to the States and the people, and must be regulated
by public opinion and the interests of trade.