How, then, is the executive branch of the Government to become
acquainted with the official conduct of the public directors or the
abuses practiced by the corporation for its private ends and in
violation of its duty to the public? The power of displacing the public
directors and that of issuing a _scire facias_ and of removing the
deposits were not intended to be idle and nugatory provisions without
the means of enforcement. Yet they must be wholly inoperative and
useless unless there be some means by which the official conduct of the
public directors and the abuses of power on the part of the corporation
may be brought to the knowledge of the executive department of the
Government.

Will it be said that the power is given to the Secretary of the
Treasury to examine himself, or by his authorized agent, into the
conduct and condition of the bank? The answer is obvious. It could not
have been expected or intended that he would make an examination unless
information was first given to him which excited his suspicions; and
if he did make such a general examination without previous information
of misconduct, it is most probable that in the complex concerns and
accounts of a bank it would result in nothing, whatever abuses might
have been practiced.

It is, indeed, the duty of every director to give information of such
misconduct on the part of the board. But the power to issue a _scire
facias_ and to remove the deposits presupposes that the directors
elected by the stockholders might abuse their power, and it can not be
presumed that Congress intended to rely on these same directors to give
information of their own misconduct. The Government is not accustomed
to rely on the offending party to disclose his offense. It was intended
that the power to issue a _scire facias_ and remove the deposits be