information called for, it would be my imperious duty to exercise
the power conferred on me by law of removing them from office and of
appointing others who would discharge their duties with more fidelity to
the public. I can never suffer anyone to hold office under me who would
connive at corruption or who should fail to give the alarm when he saw
the enemies of liberty endeavoring to sap the foundations of our free
institutions and to subject the free people of the United States to the
dominion of a great moneyed corporation.

Any directors of the bank, therefore, who might be appointed by the
Government would be required to report to the Executive as fully as the
late directors have done, and more frequently, because the danger is
more imminent; and it would be my duty to require of them a full detail
of every part of the proceedings of the corporation, or any of its
officers, in order that I might be enabled to decide whether I should
exercise the power of ordering a _scire facias_, which is reserved to
the President by the charter, or adopt such other lawful measures as the
interests of the country might require. It is too obvious to be doubted
that the misconduct of the corporation would never have been brought to
light by the aid of a public proceeding at the board of directors. The
board when called on by the Government directors refused to institute an
inquiry or require an account, and the mode adopted by the latter was
the only one by which the object could be attained. It would be absurd
to admit the right of the Government directors to give information and
at the same time deny the means of obtaining it. It would be but another
mode of enabling the bank to conceal its proceedings and practice with
impunity its corruptions. In the mode of obtaining the information,
therefore, and in their efforts to put an end to the abuses disclosed,
as well as in reporting them, the conduct of the late directors was
judicious and praiseworthy, and the honesty, firmness, and intelligence