gentlemen have been rejected, the necessary consequence will be that
the bank will hereafter be without Government directors, and the people
of the United States must be deprived of their chief means of protection
against its abuses, for whatever conflicting opinions may exist as to
the right of the directors appointed in January, 1833, to hold over
until new appointments shall be made, it is very obvious that whilst
their rejection by the Senate remains in force they can not with
propriety attempt to exercise such a power. In the present state of
things, therefore, the corporation will be enabled effectually to
accomplish the object it has been so long endeavoring to attain.
Its exchange committees and its delegated powers to its president may
hereafter be dispensed with without incurring the danger of exposing
its proceedings to the public view. The sentinels which the law had
placed at its board can no longer appear there.

Justice to myself and to the faithful officers by whom the public has
been so well and so honorably served without compensation or reward
during the last year has required of me this full and frank exposition
of my motives for nominating them again after their rejection by the
Senate. I repeat that I do not question the right of the Senate to
confirm or reject at their pleasure, and if there had been any reason
to suppose that the rejection in this case had not been produced by the
causes to which I have attributed it, or if my views of their duties and
the present importance of their rigid performance were other than they
are, I should have cheerfully acquiesced and attempted to find others
who would accept the unenviable trust; but I can not consent to appoint
directors of the bank to be the subservient instruments or silent
spectators of its abuses and corruptions, nor can I ask honorable men to
undertake the thankless duty with the certain prospect of being rebuked
by the Senate for its faithful performance in pursuance of the lawful