Now it appears to me, that the desire to punish a person who has done
harm to some individual, is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments,
both in the highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble
instincts; the impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy.

It is natural to resent, and to repel or retaliate, any harm done or
attempted against ourselves, or against those with whom we sympathize.
The origin of this sentiment it is not necessary here to discuss.
Whether it be an instinct or a result of intelligence, it is, we know,
common to all animal nature; for every animal tries to hurt those who
have hurt, or who it thinks are about to hurt, itself or its young.
Human beings, on this point, only differ from other animals in two
particulars. First, in being capable of sympathizing, not solely with
their offspring, or, like some of the more noble animals, with some
superior animal who is kind to them, but with all human, and even with
all sentient beings. Secondly, in having a more developed intelligence,
which gives a wider range to the whole of their sentiments, whether
self-regarding or sympathetic. By virtue of his superior intelligence,
even apart from his superior range of sympathy, a human being is capable
of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human
society of which he forms a part, such that any conduct which threatens
the security of the society generally, is threatening to his own, and
calls forth his instinct (if instinct it be) of self-defence. The same
superiority of intelligence, joined to the power of sympathizing with
human beings generally, enables him to attach himself to the collective
idea of his tribe, his country, or mankind, in such a manner that any
act hurtful to them rouses his instinct of sympathy, and urges him to
resistance.

The sentiment of justice, in that one of its elements which consists of