than the poor, and indeed would probably be successful in converting the
poor into their slaves. Others, again, so far defer to the same
conception of justice, as to maintain that all should pay an equal
capitation tax for the protection of their persons (these being of equal
value to all), and an unequal tax for the protection of their property,
which is unequal. To this others reply, that the all of one man is as
valuable to him as the all of another. From these confusions there is no
other mode of extrication than the utilitarian.

* * * * *

Is, then, the difference between the Just and the Expedient a merely
imaginary distinction? Have mankind been under a delusion in thinking
that justice is a more sacred thing than policy, and that the latter
ought only to be listened to after the former has been satisfied? By no
means. The exposition we have given of the nature and origin of the
sentiment, recognises a real distinction; and no one of those who
profess the most sublime contempt for the consequences of actions as an
element in their morality, attaches more importance to the distinction
than I do. While I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up
an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, I account the
justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and
incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality. Justice
is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the
essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more
absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and
the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of
justice, that of a right residing in an individual, implies and
testifies to this more binding obligation.