body. By the laws of Connecticut, slaves may receive and hold property,
and prosecute suits in their own name as plaintiffs: [This last was also
the law of Virginia in 1795. See Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p.
73.] There were also laws making marriage contracts legal, in certain
contingencies, and punishing infringements of them, ["_Reeve's Law of
Baron and Femme_," p. 340-1.]

[Footnote A: Virginia made slaves real estate by a law passed in 1705.
(_Beverly's Hist. of Va._, p. 98.) I do not find the precise time when
this law was repealed, probably when Virginia became the chief slave
breeder for the cotton-growing and sugar-planting country, and made
young men and women "from fifteen to twenty-five" the main staple
production of the State.]

Each of the laws enumerated above, does, _in principle_, abolish
slavery; and all of them together abolish it _in fact_. True, not as a
_whole_, and at a _stroke_, nor all in one place; but in its _parts_, by
piecemeal, at divers times and places; thus showing that the abolition
of slavery is within the boundary of legislation.

In the "Washington (D.C.) City Laws," page 138, is "AN ACT to prevent
horses from being cruelly beaten or abused." Similar laws have been
passed by corporations in many of the slave states, and throughout the
civilized world, such acts are punishable either as violations of common
law or of legislative enactments. If a legislature can pass laws "to
prevent _horses_ from being cruelly abused," it can pass laws to prevent
_men_ from being cruelly abused, and if it can _prevent_ cruel abuse, it
can define _what it is_. It can declare that to make men _work without
pay_ is cruel abuse, and can PROHIBIT it.