condition of the grant, that the provisions of the ordinance of '87
should be secured to the inhabitants, _with the exception of the sixth
article which prohibits slavery_; thus conceding, both the competency of
law to abolish slavery, and the power of Congress to do it, within its
jurisdiction. (These acts show the prevalent belief at that time, in the
slaveholding States, that the general government had adopted a line of
policy aiming at the exclusion of slavery from the entire territory of
the United States, not included within the original States, and that
this policy would be pursued unless prevented by specific and formal
stipulation.)

Slaveholding States have asserted this power _in their judicial
decisions_. In numerous cases their highest courts have decided that if
the legal owner of slaves takes them into those States where slavery has
been abolished either by law or by the constitution, such removal
emancipates them, such law or constitution abolishing their slavery.
This principle is asserted in the decision of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, Lunsford vs. Coquillon, 14 Martin's La. Reps. 401. Also by
the Supreme Court of Virginia, Hunter vs. Fulcher, 1 Leigh's Reps. 172.
The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Washington, of the U. S. Sup.
Court, Butler vs. Hopper, Washington's C. C. Reps. 508; also, by the
Court of Appeals in Kentucky, Rankin vs. Lydia, 2 Marshall's Reps. 407;
see also, Wilson vs. Isbell, 5 Call's Reps. 425, Spotts vs. Gillespie, 6
Randolph's Reps. 566. The State vs. Lasselle, 1 Blackford's Reps. 60,
Marie Louise vs. Mariot, 8 La. Reps. 475. In this case, which was tried
in 1836, the slave had been taken by her master to France and brought
back; Judge Matthews, of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, decided that
"residence for one moment" under the laws of France emancipated her.

6. EMINENT STATESMEN, THEMSELVES SLAVEHOLDERS, HAVE CONCEDED THIS POWER.