states have jurisdiction each in its own limits, and that there are
certain "persons" within their jurisdictions "held to service" by their
own laws_.

Finally, in the clause under consideration "private property" is not to
be taken "without just compensation." "JUST!" If justice is to be
appealed to in determining the _amount_ of compensation, let her
determine the _grounds_ also. If it be her province to say _how much_
compensation is "just," it is hers to say whether _any_ is
"just,"--whether the slave is "just" property _at all_, rather than a
"_person_". Then, if justice adjudges the slave to be "private
property," it adjudges him to be _his own_ property, since the right to
one's self is the first right--the source of all others--the original
stock by which they are accumulated--the principal, of which they are
the interest. And since the slave's "private property" has been "taken,"
and since "compensation" is impossible--there being no _equivalent_ for
one's self--the least that can be done is to restore to him his original
private property.

Having shown that in abolishing slavery, "property" would not be "taken
for public use," it may be added that, in those states where slavery has
been abolished by law, no claim for compensation has been allowed.
Indeed the manifest absurdity of demanding it seems to have quite
forestalled the _setting up_ of such a claim.

The abolition of slavery in the District instead of being a legislative
anomaly, would proceed upon the principles of every day legislation. It
has been shown already, that the United States' Constitution does not
recognize slaves as "property." Yet ordinary legislation is full of
precedents, showing that even _absolute_ property is in many respects