of the United States, with its amendments, those of the individual
states, the national treaties, and the public documents of the general
and state governments at that period, show the universal conviction of
legislative bodies, that nothing should be left to be "implied," when
great public interests were at stake.

Further: suppose Maryland and Virginia had expressed their "implied
faith" in _words_, and embodied it in their acts of cession as a
proviso, declaring that Congress should not "exercise exclusive
legislation in _all_ cases whatsoever over the District," but that the
"case" of _slavery_ should be an exception: who does not know that
Congress, if it had accepted the cession on those terms, would have
violated the Constitution; and who that has studied the free mood of
those times in its bearings on slavery--proofs of which are given in
scores on the preceding pages--[See pp. 25-37.] can be made to believe
that the people of the United States would have re-modelled their
Constitution for the purpose of providing for slavery an inviolable
sanctuary; that when driven in from its outposts, and everywhere
retreating discomfited before the march of freedom, it might be received
into everlasting habitations on the common homestead and hearth-stone of
the republic? Who can believe that Virginia made such a condition, or
cherished such a purpose, when Washington, Jefferson, Wythe, Patrick
Henry, St. George Tucker, and all her most illustrious men, were at that
moment advocating the abolition of slavery by law; when Washington had
said, two years before, that Maryland and Virginia "must have laws for
the gradual abolition of slavery, and at a period _not remote_;" and when
Jefferson in his letter to Dr. Price, three years before the cession,
had said, speaking of Virginia, "This is the next state to which we may
turn our eyes for the interesting spectacle of justice in conflict with
avarice and oppression--a conflict in which THE SACRED SIDE IS GAINING