England has recently associated herself with the Franco-Russian
Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the
spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France
she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany
under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms.

The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the
heart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So,
also, no natural community of interests exists between England and
France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to
any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an
Anglo--French _entente_. This union is cemented by the common hostility
to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two
States is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might
mask the real objects.

This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very
comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made
astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which
commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which
England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may
well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political
and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition
in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The
American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and
will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the
point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far
as territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite
of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily