power of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the case
of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary with
armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same
lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be
presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good
policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and
the Triple Alliance has already been discussed.

Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during the
Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as
mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan
Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further
intervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position in
Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence,
in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the
integrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that their
independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best
secured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction might
eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central
European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by
this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarily
unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be
essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the
expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the
geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of
the political community based on it.

We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial
territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our