one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase
our own power.

A further question, suggested by the present political position, is
whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning
of the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under a
different conception of what constitutes a State--can, or ought to be,
permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one
contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of
Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory
is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a State from
which--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, has
no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This
argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that,
in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last
mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the
neutrality of the Congo State [E] must be termed more than problematic,
since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral
country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to
the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest
moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development
presupposes such competition.

[Footnote E: The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without
guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885.]

Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal
affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the
State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and
powerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interference