3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we
have 2,944,931 trained men left. By adding the peace establishment to
it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the French
can match with about the same figures.

The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135,000. Liability to
serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the
Landsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives a
total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent.,
911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained
Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to
911,250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a
grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as
Russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe.

In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available
for field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it would
be undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available,
partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion.
However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never
reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia
present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the
enemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligent
generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even the
addition of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria would
not, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field.

In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must
be left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers [A] are already
reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple