stations--the fact, however, remains that England and France together
can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships
alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by
a vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russia
joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition
to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since
the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships,
and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our
coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the
other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of
the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be
superior to us.

As regards _matériel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is
distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our
equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a
superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless
energy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up
some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these
advantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority of
an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English.

Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under
certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in
this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente
can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time.

If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of
the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany,
we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same in